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OR years, courts and commentators have recognized that toxic
torts and mass torts present substantive and procedural issues dis-
tinct from those typically presented by other types of tort litiga-
tion.1 The special problems arising from toxic tort litigation largely result
from the latent nature of the injuries caused by exposure to chemicals or
other toxic agents and from the scientific complexity of attributing causa-
tion to a toxic exposure. Mass tort cases, because of the sheer number of
claims, present unique problems of case management. Developments in
the case law involving toxic and mass tort litigation are thus worthy of
separate review.
In the last Survey period, the Texas Legislature's enactment of the
comprehensive tort reform package known as "House Bill 4" overshad-
owed judicial developments in the areas of toxic and mass tort law.
House Bill 4 contained provisions specifically addressing certain types of
mass tort procedures and toxic tort cases,2 as well as statutes generally
affecting tort law but likely to have a particularly dramatic effect on toxic
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1. See, e.g., In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Tex. 1998) (mass tort litigation
"has caused departures from traditional ways in which cases have been filed, discovery has
proceeded, and trials have been set"); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d
706, 714 (Tex. 1997) (recognizing "difficult issues surrounding proof of causation in a toxic
tort case such as this"); CSR, Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1996) (noting
"problems inherent in many, if not all, mass tort cases"); LINDA S. MULLEMX, MASS TORT
LITIGATION CASES AND MATERIALS, at 5 (West 1996) ("mass tort litigation has evolved as
a separate and compelling set of legal and social problems that are worthy of discrete
study.").
2. See, e.g., Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003), ch. 204, § 1.01; TEX. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001-26.003 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (class actions); Tex. H.B. 4, 78th
Leg., R.S. (2003), ch. 204, § 3.02; TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. §§ 74.161-74.164 (Vernon 2005)
(multidistrict litigation); Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003), ch. 204, § 4.04; TEX. Civ.
PR~c. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (eliminating "toxic tort excep-
tion" in proportionate liability statute); Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003), ch. 204, § 17.01;
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 149.001-149.006 (Vernon 2005) (limiting asbestos-
related liabilities of successor corporations).
1183
SMU LAW REVIEW
and mass tort cases. 3 Like exposure to a chemical, however, the effect of
statutory changes to substantive and procedural law is often latent, and
many of the changes wrought by House Bill 4 have yet to be applied or
examined in court opinions.
But toxic tort law and mass tort law have continued to evolve in the
Texas state and federal courts. Many of the trends observed in previous
Surveys-stricter evaluation of expert scientific proof of causation, cir-
cumscription of duties owned by product suppliers and premises owners
to workers and bystanders, and wariness of collective methods of resolv-
ing tort cases such as class actions, consolidations, and joint settlements-
are reflected in this Survey period. This Survey period also exhibited sev-
eral new trends, including a willingness of the newly-created Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL Panel") to certify litigation for
collective pretrial management and a renewed vigor on the part of appel-
late courts in protecting defendants in toxic and mass tort cases from dis-
covery perceived as overbroad and coercive. Whether these trends
continue or subside, and whether House Bill 4 will have as drastic an
effect on toxic and mass tort litigation as many suspect, will undoubtedly
be explored in future Surveys.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. ORDERS OF THE MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION PANEL
In 2003, as part of the legislative tort-reform package known as House
Bill 4, the Texas Legislature passed a series of statutes creating a system
for centralizing cases presenting common questions of fact in a single dis-
trict court for pretrial management. 4 The legislation created the MDL
Panel consisting of five active court of appeals justices or administrative
judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court, to
consider motions to transfer particular cases pending in the Texas trial
courts to a district court for "consolidated or coordinated pretrial pro-
ceedings. '' 5 Pursuant to a directive in the legislation, 6 the Texas Supreme
Court promulgated Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Judicial Administration
to govern the management of cases transferred by the MDL Panel to
"pretrial" courts.7 This Survey period presented the MDL Panel with its
3. See, e.g., Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003), ch. 204, § 4.04; TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (eliminating various exceptions in propor-
tionate liability statute); Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003), ch. 204, § 5.02; TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.008 (Vernon 2005) (limiting liability of manufacturers of
products that comply with federal regulations).
4. Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003), ch. 204, § 3.02; TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§§ 74.161-74.164 (Vernon 2005).
5. Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003), ch. 204, § 3.02; TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN.
§§ 74.161 (Vernon 2005).
6. Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003), ch. 204, § 3.02; TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§§ 74.163 (Vernon 2005).
7. TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13, reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. F app.
(Vernon 1988).
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first opportunities to consider requests to transfer cases under the new
legislation.
Fittingly, the first request to transfer considered by the MDL Panel
involved asbestos litigation, frequently referred to by commentators as
the "mother of all mass torts."8 On December 30, 2003, in a 3-2 decision,
the MDL Panel ordered the transfer of all asbestos litigation in the state
filed after September 1, 2003 to a single judge for pretrial proceedings.
The MDL Panel's short per curiam opinion tracked the statutory lan-
guage in finding that the asbestos cases "involve one or more common
questions of fact, and that transfer of these cases and tag-along cases to
one district judge will be for the convenience of the parties and witnesses
and will promote the just and efficient conduct of the cases." 9 In dissent,
Justice Kidd observed that Texas trial courts had already resolved almost
30,000 cases without the supervision of a single judge, and contrasted that
"success" with the federal experience, in which multidistrict transfer of
asbestos litigation had caused "that dreaded disease commonly known as
'pretrial paralysis."' 10 In a subsequent order, the MDL Panel assigned
the asbestos cases to Judge Mark Davidson of the 11th District Court of
Harris County. 1
In May, the MDL Panel granted an unopposed motion to transfer sev-
eral cases involving allegedly defective Firestone tires on Ford vehicles to
a single court for pretrial proceedings. The MDL Panel assigned the
cases to Judge Michael Mayes of the 410th District Court of Montgomery
County.12
Most recently, the MDL Panel ordered the transfer of cases involving
allegations of injury caused by exposure to silica to Judge Tracy Christo-
pher of the 295th District Court of Harris County for coordinated pretrial
management. 13 In an opinion delivered by Justice Peeples and joined by
Justices Hanks and Lang, the MDL Panel concluded that the silica cases
present common fact questions and that transfer would promote the con-
venience of parties and witnesses and the just and efficient handling of
the cases. Responding to the contention that transfer was unnecessary
8. Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV.
1721, 1756 (2002); see also Mary J. Davis, Mass Tort Litigation: Congress's Silent, But
Deadly, Reform Effort, 64 TEN. L. REV. 913, 918 (1997), and Alex J. Grant, Note, When
Does the Clock Start Ticking? Applying the Statute of Limitations in Asbestos Property
Damage Actions, 80 CoRN. L. REV. 695, 696 (1995).
9. Union Carbide v. Audrey Amelia Adams, No. 03-0895 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel Dec. 30,
2003), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state..tx.us/historical/2003/dec/030895.htm.
10. Id. (Kidd, J., dissenting), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state..tx.us/histor-
ical/2003/dec/030895.htm.
11. Union Carbide v. Audrey Amelia Adams, No. 03-0895 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel Jan. 13,
2004), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state..tx.us/opinions/case.asp?filinglD=
24276.
12. In re Firestone Ford Litig., No. 04-0262 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel May 4, 2004), available
at http://www.supreme.courts.state..tx.us/mdl 2.pdf.





because silica litigation in Texas courts had been proceeding efficiently,
the MDL Panel noted that "Rule 13 is not limited to correcting ongoing
problems from the past; it seeks to prevent the occurrence of problems in
the future."1 4 Justice Kidd again dissented, expressing his view that
"MDL consolidation is an extraordinary remedy that should only be con-
sidered where the burden of proof has been met."15 Noting that the ma-
jor silica defendants and all of the plaintiffs opposed transfer, Justice
Kidd found silica litigation in Texas to be "as close to a perfect litigant-
driven system as can be found," and believed MDL transfer of the litiga-
tion under that circumstance to be "inconvenient, unjust, inefficient, and
unneeded. '16
B. CASE MANAGEMENT ISSUES
1. Consolidation
In In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court issued a
writ of mandamus to vacate an order consolidating the cases of twenty
plaintiffs who alleged injuries caused by exposure to a "toxic soup" of
chemicals at the plant at which they worked. After noting that the tort
was immature because "no 'toxic soup' case has ever been tried or ap-
pealed in Texas,"' 17 the court analyzed consolidation in light of the nine
"Maryland factors" adopted in In re Ethyl Corp.18 to guide consolidation
of mass tort cases. The court found that the consolidated cases did not
satisfy four of the factors: (1) plaintiffs did not share a common worksite
since the large plant had several separate work areas and buildings, each
serviced by different air conditioning and ventilation systems; (2) the
plaintiffs did not have similar occupations and, therefore, were not ex-
posed to the same chemicals or the same combination of chemicals; (3)
the plaintiffs were not exposed to chemicals on the same dates or for the
same length of time since the plaintiffs began working at the plant over a
span of thirteen years; and (4) the plaintiffs were not complaining of simi-
lar injuries but rather alleged more than fifty-five physical ailments with
no two plaintiffs alleging identical symptoms. Though the court found
that the remaining factors-including whether plaintiffs were alive or de-
ceased, the status of discovery, and identity of counsel-weighed in favor
of consolidation, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion in
consolidating the cases because the dissimilarities outweighed the similar-
ities. The court also held that mandamus was proper given the "ex-
traordinary circumstances" of the case since "[ ]uror confusion and
prejudice, under these facts is almost certain, and it would be impossible
for an appellate court to untangle the confusion or prejudice on
14. Id., available at http://www.supreme.courts.state..tx.us/Historical/2004/nov/04-
0606%20-%20MAJORITY%200PINION.htm.
15. Id. (Kidd, J., dissenting), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state..tx.us/Histor-
ical/2004/nov/04-0606% 20- %20DISSENT%200PINION.htm.
16. Id.
17. In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203, 208 (Tex. 2004).
18. In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. 1998).
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appeal."' 19
In another mandamus action, In re Amfels, Inc., the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's consolidation of ten silicosis
cases involving approximately 700 plaintiffs and eighty defendants, origi-
nally filed in six district courts in Cameron County. The judge of the
197th District Court ordered all cases transferred to her court. The
judges in two other district courts in Cameron County-the 138th District
and 404th District-refused to transfer the cases in their courts since they
neither authorized nor agreed to the transfers. The defendants in the
cases filed petitions for writ of mandamus to order the judges in the 138th
and 404th District Courts to vacate all orders issued subsequent to the
transfer and to transfer their cases to the 197th District, and filed motions
for emergency stays pending the mandamus petitions. The plaintiffs then
filed a cross petition for writ of mandamus, ordering the judge of the
197th District to vacate her consolidation order and to assign the cases to
their original courts, except for the cases transferred on the basis of vol-
untary recusal. The court stayed all proceedings pending its review of the
mandamus petitions. The court held that, rather than a mandamus pro-
ceeding, "the better approach" would be for the local administrative
judge to resolve the dispute.20 The court found that the local administra-
tive judge is statutorily charged with local rules of administration, includ-
ing the transfer of cases, and "is in the better position to interpret the
Cameron County local rules."'21 The court denied the petitions and cross
petition for mandamus and vacated its emergency stay order.
2. Docket Management
In In re Union Carbide Corp., the Fourteenth Court of Appeals de-
clined to require the trial court presiding over the state's multidistrict as-
bestos litigation to adopt a scheduling order proposed by defendants that
would indefinitely defer trial of cases involving injuries that do not satisfy
certain medical criteria. Defendants had moved the MDL pretrial court
to create a special "inactive" docket for "unimpaired" plaintiffs. After
conducting an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the pretrial court re-
fused to create such a docket and issued findings of fact and conclusions
of law in support of its decision. Defendants asked the court of appeals
to issue a writ of mandamus requiring the pretrial court to create the
proposed "inactive" docket, specifically urging the court to review the
pretrial court's conclusions that the proposed docket would violate the
Texas Constitution and other provisions of Texas law. The court of ap-
peals declined to reach the issue of whether the pretrial court's legal con-
clusions were correct because the material facts on which the scheduling
motion was based were disputed and because the defendants were not
19. In re Van Waters, 145 S.W.3d at 211.
20. In re Amfels, Inc., 129 S.W.3d 810, 813 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. de-
nied); In re U.S. Silica Co., 48 Tex. Sup. J. 410 (Tex. 2005).
21. In re Amfels, Inc., 129 S.W.3d at 814.
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entitled as a matter of law to the relief that they sought in the motion (the
creation of an inactive docket). The court of appeals concluded that de-
fendants had failed to demonstrate that the pretrial court abused its dis-
cretion in declining to adopt defendants' "inactive docket" proposal,
finding it "clear" that "the MDL Court is diligently attempting to deal
efficiently with the difficult and challenging issues presented by the mas-
sive MDL docket."'22
3. Class Actions
In Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chemical Group, Inc., the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of a class action suit against the seller and manu-
facturers of polybutylene ("PB") plumbing systems that sought to super-
sede or supplement relief obtained in prior class actions in state courts in
Tennessee and Alabama. The plaintiff alleged that defendants' PB sys-
tems were inherently defective and that leaks from the systems caused
damage to class members' homes. The plaintiff tried to avoid the preclu-
sive effect of the prior class action judgments by alleging that, by collud-
ing with class counsel in settling the prior actions, the defendants had
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act ("RICO"). The Fifth Circuit held that the Rooker-Feld-
man doctrine, which provides that the lower federal courts lack
jurisdiction to review constitutional deficiencies "inextricably inter-
twined" in state court judgments, required dismissal of the plaintiff's class
action complaint.2 3 The court recognized the "tension" between the need
to review whether the absent class members, such as plaintiff, were sub-
ject to the state court's jurisdiction and bound by its judgment on the one
hand and, on the other hand, Rooker-Feldman's prohibition against fed-
eral review of substantive state court findings. 24 The court ultimately re-
lieved the tension in this case by noting that the plaintiff's § 1983 claim
was "clearly untenable" and "groundless. 12 5 Because the plaintiff's
§ 1983 claim merely served "as an instrument for evading Rooker-Feld-
man," the district court did not err in dismissing the claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 26 The court added that dismissal of the RICO
claim for disgorgement of profits was also appropriate because the statute
authorizes equitable remedies only to prevent ongoing and future con-
duct and that plaintiff failed to argue that disgorgement would "prevent
and restrain" the defendants from producing PB plumbing systems or
from violating RICO in the future.2 7 The dissent criticized the majority's
22. In re Union Carbide Corp., 145 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2004, pet. denied).
23. Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Group, Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 46 (2004) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)
and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)).
24. Richard, 355 F.3d at 351.
25. Id. at 352, 354.
26. Id. at 352.
27. Id. at 355.
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interpretation of RICO on this point, finding it "to be self-evident to
courts and litigants alike that a prayer for disgorgement of profits in a
case like this one is intended to prevent and restrain similar future
conduct." 28
In In re Wood, the Texas Supreme Court held that in a putative class
action governed by an arbitration clause, issues relating to the propriety
of class certification should ordinarily be decided by the arbitrator and
not the court. In Wood, claimants in the breast implant litigation filed a
class action suit against the attorney that handled their claims alleging
that he improperly deducted from their settlement proceeds a 1.5 percent
assessment to reimburse himself for "common expenses. ' 29 The attor-
ney-client contracts included a provision that all disputes arising out of
the fee agreement would be submitted to binding arbitration. The trial
court ordered the case, including the class certification issue, to arbitra-
tion; the court of appeals conditionally issued a writ of mandamus di-
recting the trial court and not the arbitrator to decide whether the claims
could proceed as a class or must be individually arbitrated. Citing a re-
cent decision of the United States Supreme Court, the Texas Supreme
Court concluded that the issue of class arbitrability is one of contract in-
terpretation that is "committed to the arbitrator. '30 The court thus held
that "the court of appeals abused its discretion in directing the trial court
to decide the class certification issue."'3 1
4. Discovery
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court acted twice to pro-
tect defendants in mass tort cases from what the court found to be im-
proper discovery requests. In In re Dana Corp., the Texas Supreme
Court held that the efforts of over 1,200 plaintiffs in asbestos litigation to
discover information about the defendant's available insurance coverage
is limited both by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.3(f), which specifi-
cally governs discovery of insurance policies held by the defendant, and
by the general scope of discovery relevance standard in Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 192.3(a). The trial court had ordered the defendant to
satisfy the plaintiffs' request for production of all insurance policies ob-
tained by the defendant from 1930 through the present and ordered the
defendant to produce for deposition a witness to testify "regarding such
insurance policies. '32 A subgroup of forty-nine plaintiffs filed affidavits
describing their exposure to the defendant's asbestos products; none,
however, could demonstrate exposure earlier than 1945. The defendant
argued that production of their insurance policies should not be ordered
until all plaintiffs produced evidence of exposure to the defendant's prod-
28. Id. at 356 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
29. In re Wood, 140 S.W.3d 367, 368 (Tex. 2004).
30. Id. at 369 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality
op.)).
31. In re Wood, 140 S.W.3d at 370.
32. In re Dana Corp., 138 S.W.3d 298, 300 (Tex. 2004).
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ucts. The supreme court rejected the defendant's contention "that a spe-
cial rule should apply in toxic-tort cases," but nevertheless held that the
trial court abused its discretion in ordering production of insurance poli-
cies issued before 1945. 33 The court noted that under Rule 192.3(f), in-
surance policies are not discoverable "until they are shown to be
applicable to a potential judgment," 34 and reasoned that because the
plaintiffs had not shown that pre-1945 policies would cover any of the
plaintiffs' claims, the trial court should not have compelled production of
the policies. The court also held that the order requiring the defendant to
produce a witness to testify "regarding such insurance policies" was not
per se improper, but warned that insurance information beyond the exis-
tence and content of the policies-such as the amount of unexhausted
coverage remaining under the policies, the number of plaintiffs essen-
tially competing for insurance proceeds, and "policy erosion" in gen-
eral-are typically outside the scope of permissible discovery. Although
the plaintiffs' interest in such matters is understandable, those matters
usually do not relate to the actual underlying "claim or defense" of the
party seeking discovery, and are thus not usually discoverable under the
terms of the general scope of discovery rule, Texas Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 192.3(a). 35
In In re E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., the Texas Supreme Court held
that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to conduct an in camera
review of documents withheld from production by the defendant on the
ground that they were protected by the attorney-client or work product
privilege. In response to requests for production propounded by almost
400 plaintiffs in a suit to recover damages for asbestos-related injuries,
defendant DuPont produced a detailed privilege log accompanied by an
affidavit describing, by category, the basis for each assertion of privilege.
The documents fell into three categories: documents showing only the
names of members of DuPont's legal department; documents showing
both "DuPont Legal" and other names; and documents not showing on
their face a "DuPont Legal" connection. The trial court ordered produc-
tion of the documents in the second and third categories without con-
ducting an in camera review. The supreme court held that although the
affidavit failed to establish a prima facie basis for withholding documents
in the third category, it did so for the second category; the affidavit ade-
quately explained that some documents might be protected by the attor-
ney-client or work product privilege even though all senders or recipients
were not identified as "DuPont Legal" on the document. The court also
noted that DuPont's global affidavit adequately presented the prima facie
support for the claim of privilege and that plaintiffs' global challenge of
the privilege log sufficiently placed the claims of privilege in issue.36
33. Id. at 301.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 302-04.
36. In re E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 221-27 (Tex. 2004).
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The courts of appeals have actively enforced the Texas Supreme
Court's recent directive to restrict discovery in toxic tort and mass tort
cases to products and facilities that the plaintiff actually encountered. 37
In In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., the plaintiff claimed that he developed
mesothelioma as a result of his exposure to products sold by Sears, a na-
tionwide retailer, and thirty-seven other defendants. The plaintiff pro-
pounded a sixty-four-page set of discovery requests to Sears which
included, for example, interrogatories asking Sears to identify the name
and asbestos content of every asbestos-containing product it ever sold,
and to identify the name and address of all Sears sales offices or author-
ized dealers of asbestos-containing home construction products in the
United States. The trial court, in a series of written and oral rulings, com-
pelled Sears to answer the discovery requests. But the Fourteenth Dis-
trict Court of Appeals, in an opinion authored by then-Chief Justice
Brister, ruled that the discovery requests were overbroad. The court
noted that the plaintiff's discovery responses showed exposure to only
two Sears products-boilers and water heaters-and that his counsel's
guess that he was exposed to other Sears products did not justify the addi-
tional discovery requests. The court acknowledged that "asbestos claim-
ants face substantial obstacles in proving the products to which they were
exposed decades earlier," but noted that these difficulties do not entitle
claimants "to recover money from all companies selling asbestos prod-
ucts."' 38 Because the "discovery requests could have been more narrowly
tailored" to address the products to which the plaintiff could actually
show exposure, the court held the trial court abused its discretion in com-
pelling the discovery.3 9
In a different but factually similar and identically styled case, the Beau-
mont Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in
ordering defendants in asbestos litigation to produce information poten-
tially demonstrating general knowledge of the hazards of asbestos but not
specifically related to the circumstances of the decedent's exposure. The
decedent died at age twenty-six of mesothelioma; his exposure to asbes-
tos occurred through contact with his stepfather's work clothes, which
were laden with asbestos dust from his stepfather's work on automotive
brakes for his employer Sears. The plaintiffs sought production from
Sears and Ford of all files of workers' compensation claims against the
companies based on asbestos-related disease. The plaintiffs also sought
from Sears all minutes and other corporate documents in which asbestos
issues were discussed and all records of OSHA violations related to as-
bestos. The court of appeals held that both categories of requests were
overbroad. Although some of the workers' compensation documents
"may have a tendency to show a fact of consequence in the case," the
37. See In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. 2003).
38. In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th
Dist.] 2003, pet. granted).
39. Id. at 579.
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request for all files from all locations was too broad to justify the expense
of production. 40 Similarly, the request for Sears documents discussing as-
bestos and for records of OSHA violations was overbroad "without tying
the discovery to the type of exposure, a reasonable time period, the rele-
vant location, and the particular products or work involved.
4 1
On the other hand, in Hill & Griffith Co. v. Bryant, the Tyler Court of
Appeals upheld sanctions imposed by a trial court against a defendant for
wrongfully withholding documents from production in response to plain-
tiffs' broad discovery requests. In Hill & Griffith, the plaintiffs alleged
that they had sustained injuries caused by their exposure to the defen-
dant's silica products, and requested production of "all internal memo-
randa related to the marketing of silica-containing products sold to
Plaintiffs' employer. '42 In response to the request, the defendant pro-
duced warning labels affixed to its silica products, but did not produce an
internal memorandum detailing the history of the warning labels previ-
ously produced. On the plaintiffs' motion, the trial court awarded mone-
tary and community service sanctions against the defendant and its
counsel, rejecting the defendant's argument that the memo concerning
warning labels was not responsive to the request for information concern-
ing marketing. The court of appeals upheld the sanctions, noting that the
trial court's "expansive and liberal view of Plaintiffs' discovery re-
quests... corresponds with the views taken by both the Texas Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court."'43
5. Issues Relating to Professional Responsibility
The Texas Supreme Court and the courts of appeals had several oppor-
tunities to consider the propriety of attorney conduct in mass and toxic
tort litigation. In In re Kansas City Southern Industries, a defendant that
had settled the claims of over two thousand plaintiffs who alleged expo-
sure to a hazardous chemical that leaked from a railroad car asked the
Texas Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus requiring the return of
settlement monies allocated to minors who could not be located and did
not sign releases. The plaintiffs and the guardian ad litem opposed the
request, arguing that the settlement was in the minors' best interests,
whether their parents knew and approved the settlement or not. The su-
preme court denied the writ, ruling that the defendant had an adequate
remedy through appeal of any final trial court order approving the settle-
ment.44 Justice Hecht filed a concurring opinion in which he noted that
the denial of relief "in no way suggests that the children's claims were
properly settled" and described as "astonishing" the notion that it would
40. In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 146 S.W.3d 328, 332-33 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004,
pet. granted).
41. Id. at 334.
42. Hill & Griffith Co. v. Bryant, 139 S.W.3d 688, 691 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2004, pet.
denied).
43. Id. at 695.
44. In re Kansas City S. Indus., 139 S.W.3d 669, 670 (Tex. 2004).
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be "in the best interest of a party before the court to have his claim for
personal injuries settled without his knowledge. '45
In re Mitcham illustrates the danger that the mobility of legal profes-
sionals poses to law firms practicing in a specialized area of the law such
as toxic torts. Waters & Kraus, a law firm that represents plaintiffs in
asbestos litigation, hired as an attorney Mortola-Strasser, who previously
worked as a paralegal for a law firm that represented Texas Utilities
("TXU"), a defendant in the asbestos litigation. Waters and Mortola-
Strasser signed an agreement with TXU in which they agreed that neither
they nor any Waters & Kraus attorneys would participate in asbestos suits
against TXU or "[s]hare any information with any person regarding the
facts and circumstances surrounding [TXU's] use of asbestos. '46 After
Mortola-Strasser left Waters & Kraus, the firm filed an asbestos-related
lawsuit against TXU on behalf of the Mitchams. TXU moved to disqual-
ify Waters & Kraus; the trial court denied the motion. In a decision re-
ported in last year's Survey, the Waco Court of Appeals issued a writ of
mandamus requiring the disqualification of Waters & Kraus. 47 The court
of appeals based its decision on the irrebutable presumption that a lawyer
will share the confidences of a former client with a new employer, even
though Mortola-Strasser was theoretically exposed to TXU's confidences
only as a non-lawyer.48 Waters & Kraus sought mandamus of the court of
appeals' decision from the Texas Supreme Court.
The supreme court avoided the issue of whether Mortola-Strasser and
Waters & Kraus were bound by the irrebutable presumption of disclosure
applied to lawyers or the rebuttable presumption of disclosure applied to
non-lawyers. It ruled instead that Waters & Kraus' engagement as coun-
sel for the Mitchams was precluded by Waters' agreement with TXU not
to share any information about its use of asbestos. The court concluded
that because Waters & Kraus "cannot give the Mitchams the representa-
tion to which they are entitled" without violating the agreement with
TXU, disqualification of the firm was required.49
Because of the high stakes and scientific uncertainty in most toxic and
mass tort cases, such cases have a higher propensity than other types of
litigation to generate post-resolution charges of mistake, attorney miscon-
duct, or outright fraud-in other words, to get ugly. Atlantic Lloyds In-
surance Co. v. Butler, in which the parties sought to avoid the terms of a
settlement of a toxic tort case based on reciprocal charges that one side
fraudulently induced the other to settle, provides a textbook example.
The plaintiffs in the underlying case were residents of an apartment com-
plex that had been sprayed with chlordane, an insecticide. They sued the
45. Id. at 671 (Hecht, J., concurring).
46. In re Mitcham, 133 S.W.3d 274, 277 (Tex. 2004).
47. See Brent M. Rosenthal, Misty A. Farris & Carla M. Burke, Toxic Torts and Mass
Torts, 57 SMU L. REV. 1267, 1283 (2004) (discussing In re TXU Holdings Co., 110 S.W.3d
62 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied)).
48. In re TXU Holdings Co., 110 S.W.3d at 66-67.
49. In re Mitcham, 133 S.W.3d at 277.
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owner and the two corporate managers of the complex, alleging that they
had sustained injuries caused by their exposure to the chemical. One of
the managers, H.R. Management Company ("HRM"), held three insur-
ance policies: a primary coverage policy of $300,000, a $15 million um-
brella policy issued by Centennial, and a separate $10 million policy also
issued by Centennial. Centennial contended that the $15 million policy
did not cover the plaintiffs' claims but did not deny coverage by the $10
million policy. The plaintiffs settled with HRM for a total of approxi-
mately $9.7 million (the total of the $300,000 and $10 million policies, less
the amount paid in settlement to another plaintiff) based in part, the
plaintiffs later alleged, on HRM's representation that the settlement con-
sumed all of HRM's uncontested coverage for the claims. After the
plaintiffs' noticed that the settlement check delivered to them was drafted
against the $15 million policy, they sued HRM and its agents, alleging
that HRM had breached an agreement to pay plaintiffs in settlement all
available insurance coverage, and that HRM's misrepresentation of the
value of available coverage fraudulently induced plaintiffs to settle.
HRM countered with allegations that plaintiffs fraudulently obtained the
settlement by exaggerating or falsely representing their injuries and
damages.50
The First District Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment
against the plaintiffs on the principal claims and against the defendants
on the counterclaims. The court found that the settlement agreement
specified that HRM would pay a sum certain to resolve the claims, and
that this settlement provision could not be contradicted by extrinsic evi-
dence that HRM had agreed to pay all of its insurance coverage in settle-
ment of the claims. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' fraud theory,
finding that the settlement releases signed by the plaintiffs expressly pro-
vided that plaintiffs had not relied on any representation by HRM in
agreeing to the settlement. Finally, the court rejected HRM's allegation
that the plaintiffs had fraudulently induced HRM to settle by submitting
false proof in support of their claims. The court noted that because the
parties were "engaged in litigation and negotiating at arm's length and
from equal bargaining positions," the defendant could not claim reasona-
ble or justifiable reliance on the plaintiffs representations "that, with rea-
sonable diligence, could easily have been refuted.
51
In Goffney v. O'Quinn, the First District Court of Appeals rejected the
claims of fourteen disgruntled plaintiffs against their former attorneys for
allegedly coercing them to settle their toxic tort claims for inadequate
amounts. The plaintiffs were among 406 workers and family members
who claimed that they sustained injuries as a result of their exposure to
chemicals at the Brio superfund site near Houston. After receiving what
they considered an inadequate settlement offer, they discharged their at-
50. Atlantic Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Butler, 137 S.W.3d 199, 206-07 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
51. Id. at 226.
[Vol. 581194
Toxic Torts and Mass Torts
torneys and hired new counsel. They then accepted the settlement offer
and sued their former attorneys under a variety of theories, including le-
gal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the attorneys, and the court of appeals
affirmed. The court found that the plaintiffs had presented no evidence
that they would have prevailed in the underlying toxic tort suit, particu-
larly on the issue of causation. The court also noted that the plaintiffs'
claim of breach of fiduciary duty was foreclosed by conclusive proof that
the plaintiffs had settled their toxic tort claims voluntarily on the inde-
pendent advice of their new counsel. 52
The high-stakes and pressurized environment of mass tort litigation
provides a fertile breeding ground for inter-lawyer fee disputes. The
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals resolved one such dispute in an interest-
ing and lengthy memorandum opinion in Hoeffner, Bilek & Eidman,
L.L.P. v. Guerra. In that case, two lawyers, Guerra and Beam, inter-
vened in a mass toxic tort case to claim a portion of the contingent fee
recovered by lead plaintiffs' counsel, Hoeffner, Bilek & Eidman, L.L.P.
("HBE"). Guerra and Beam asserted that a written agreement in which
they agreed to serve as local counsel in the case promised them a fee;
HBE argued that the lawyers were not entitled to the fee because they
breached the agreement and their fiduciary duty to the clients by aban-
doning work on the case. The trial court held a bench trial and ruled that
HBE had committed an anticipatory breach of the contract by attempting
to coerce Guerra to accept a lower fee than that specified in the contract
and then refusing to work with him. It held that Guerra was therefore
justified in failing to perform and was entitled to his contractual fee, but
refused to award Guerra additional attorneys' fees for bringing his breach
of contract claim. The court also ruled that Beam was not entitled to the
contractual fee because he had declared his intent to leave the practice of
law and thereby abandoned the contract. All parties appealed. The court
of appeals affirmed the award of fees to Guerra and the denial of fees to
Beam, holding that sufficient evidence supported the trial court's find-
ings. The court modified the judgment to award Guerra attorneys' fees
for prosecuting his fee claim and to add postjudgment interest to the
award at ten percent. 53
C. PROCEDURAL DEFENSES
1. Personal Jurisdiction
In Koll Real Estate Group, Inc. v. Howard, the Fourteenth District
Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to attribute to a non-
resident corporation the jurisdictional contacts-and asbestos-related
52. Goffney v. O'Quinn, No. 01-02-00192-CV, 2004 WL 2415067, at *9 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 28, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication).
53. Hoeffner, Bilek & Eidman, L.L.P. v. Guerra, No. 13-01-503-CV, 2004 WL




torts-of its predecessors. Following the lead of the First Court of Ap-
peals in Koll Real Estate Group, Inc. v. Pursely, reported in last year's
Survey,54 the court found that the defendant acquired only indemnity ob-
ligations and not liabilities for its predecessor's torts. The court then
adopted the reasoning of the Purseley court, holding that even if the in-
demnity obligations constituted a "minimum contact," these agreements
could not form the basis to assert specific jurisdiction because the plain-
tiffs' cause of action did not arise from the indemnity agreement. 55
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Rodriguez Delgado v. Shell Oil Co. is yet another chapter in the Dick-
ensian saga of the litigation brought in Texas state court by Costa Rican
banana plantation workers against the makers of the pesticide known as
DBCP. In Rodriquez Delgado, a federal court in the Southern District of
Texas considered whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the
plaintiffs' motion to reinstate claims in light of a 2003 case from the
United States Supreme Court. The plaintiffs had filed their suits in state
court in 1994, but two third-party defendants known as the Dead Sea
entities removed the cases to federal court alleging that they were instru-
mentalities of the State of Israel entitled to remove under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"). 56 In 1995, the district court found
the removal proper, granted a motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, and included a return jurisdiction clause in the
dismissal order. The Fifth Circuit affirmed all rulings and the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.57 When the highest court in
Costa Rica affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims, the plaintiffs
filed a motion to reinstate the claims in the Southern District of Texas.
But in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, which was reported in last year's
Survey 58 the United States Supreme Court "squarely rejected" the dis-
trict court's and Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the original removal was
proper, holding that the Dead Sea entities were not "instrumentalities"
but "indirect subsidiaries" of the State of Israel under FSIA.59 The dis-
trict court was confronted with the questions of whether it had jurisdic-
tion to enforce the return clause, or, for that matter, to take any action in
light of the Supreme Court's holding in Patrickson. The court held that,
although its assertion of subject matter jurisdiction was erroneous in light
of Patrickson, the forum non conveniens dismissal of the action and the
54. See Rosenthal, supra note 47, at 1287 (discussing Koll Real Estate Group, Inc. v.
Purseley, 127 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.)).
55. Koll Real Estate Group, Inc. v. Howard, 130 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (2005).
57. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972
(2001).
58. See Rosenthal, supra note 47, at 1291 (discussing Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538
U.S. 468 (2003)).
59. Rodriguez Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 322 F. Supp. 2d 798, 802-03 (S.D. Tex. 2004)
(describing the effect of Patrickson on the court's prior holdings).
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return jurisdiction clause remained valid and enforceable because the Su-
preme Court issued the Patrickson decision after the district court's rul-
ings became operative. The court also held that although the Patrickson
decision terminated the court's ancillary enforcement jurisdiction in the
case preventing it from ruling on the plaintiffs' motion to reinstate claims,
Patrickson did not terminate its power to remand because the forum non
conveniens dismissal was not a final judgment. The court remanded the
pending motion to reinstate claims to Texas state court. 60
3. Venue
In In re Shell Oil Co., the Beaumont Court of Appeals rejected an at-
tempt by plaintiffs to avoid the effect of an order transferring venue by
nonsuiting the case and filing it in another county. The plaintiffs, who
alleged that they had sustained injuries caused by exposure to benzene,
initially filed suit in Orange County. After the defendants moved to
transfer the cases to Harris County, the plaintiffs filed an identical suit in
Jefferson County. The Orange County court granted the motion to trans-
fer the case in that court to Harris County. The plaintiffs then nonsuited
the Harris County case. The defendants moved to transfer the Jefferson
County case to Harris County. The trial court denied the motion, but the
court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus to require the transfer. The
court held that, under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 87.5, once an action
has been transferred to a proper county in response to a motion to trans-
fer venue-in this case, from Orange County to Harris County-then
venue is established for any subsequent suit involving the same subject
matter and the same parties as the initial suit. The court added that the
trial court's error in denying transfer was an "exceptional circumstance"
for which mandamus was proper since mandamus is available "to correct
improper venue procedure."' 6' The dissent disagreed with the propriety
of mandamus in this case, finding that the Jefferson County court's ruling
on the motion to transfer venue did not constitute "exceptional circum-
stances" under Texas Supreme Court mandamus precedent. 62
4. Limitations
In Schneider National Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, the Texas Supreme Court
reversed a decision of the First District Court of Appeals reported in a
previous Survey,63 and held that plaintiffs' property damage claims con-
cerning "contaminants, odors, lights, and noise from the plants" near the
Houston Ship Channel were for a permanent rather than a temporary
60. Rodriguez Delgado, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 817.
61. In re Shell Oil Co., 128 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, pet.
granted).
62. Id. at 698, 701 (Burgess, J., dissenting).
63. See Brent M. Rosenthal, Toxic Torts and Mass Torts, 56 SMU L. REV. 2053, 2054-
55 (2003) (discussing Bates v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc., 95 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. App. -
Houston [lst Dist.] 2002), rev'd, 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. 2004)).
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nuisance and were thus barred by the statute of limitations. 64 Under
Texas law, the statute of limitations begins to run for a permanent nui-
sance on the date the nuisance commences, but begins anew for each in-
jury caused by a temporary nuisance. The court held that a nuisance is
temporary "only if it is so irregular or intermittent over the period lead-
ing up to the filing and trial that future injury cannot be estimated with
reasonable centrality [sic]," and a nuisance is permanent "if it is suffi-
ciently constant or regular (no matter how long between occurrences)
that future impact can be reasonably evaluated. ' 65 This test requires that
the conditions be evaluated over a period of years; if the nuisance is pre-
dictable and frequent enough to lower market values of the neighboring
land, the nuisance is likely to be permanent. The court also held that, if
either the defendant's operations or the plaintiff's injuries are frequent
and regular, it raises a rebuttable presumption that the nuisance is perma-
nent-i.e., a constant source causing constant injuries. Finally, the court
held that whether the nuisance can or will be abated is not a factor in
determining whether the nuisance is temporary or permanent. Based on
the court's newly established guidelines, the court held that the plaintiffs'
affidavits established a permanent nuisance as a matter of law because
they described "conditions that occur at least several times in most weeks
or months," frequently enough to allow the jury to assess the impact of
the nuisance on property values. 66
In Youngblood v. United States Silica Co., the Texarkana Court of Ap-
peals reversed summary judgment on the statute of limitations, finding a
fact issue concerning the date on which the plaintiff knew or should have
known he had silicosis. Although the plaintiff had been told he had ab-
normal x-rays for several years before suit was filed, the plaintiff con-
sulted a physician every time he was informed of an abnormal x-ray and
denied that he was told he had silicosis until the year before he filed suit;
while the medical records showed differential diagnoses (which included
silicosis as a possibility), the records did "not affirmatively indicate
Youngblood was ever made aware of these differential diagnoses." 67 The
court held that the plaintiff's repeated visits to his physician after he was
notified of abnormal x-rays demonstrated "due diligence in trying to find
the cause of his abnormal x-rays. ' '68 In light of his efforts and the plain-
tiff's testimony that the doctors did not inform him that he had silicosis,
the plaintiff presented "more than a scintilla of evidence" that he discov-
ered his injury within the limitations period and reasonably could not
have discovered it sooner.69
64. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 268 (Tex. 2004).
65. Id. at 281.
66. Id. at 290.
67. Youngblood v. United States Silica Co., 130 S.W.3d 461, 470 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 2004, pet. denied).
68. Id. at 471.
69. Id.
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In Blackmon v. American Home Products Corp., a federal district court
held that the plaintiffs' failure to pursue administrative remedies for their
children's autism allegedly caused by the vaccine preservative thimerosal,
as required by the Vaccine Act,70 barred them from pursuing common
law tort remedies. The plaintiffs failed to file administrative claims be-
cause they would have been untimely; the Vaccine Act required them to
file such claims within thirty-six months of the manifestation of injuries
alleged to be caused by the vaccine, and the plaintiffs did not discover the
possible causal link between thimerosal and autism within that time. The
court rejected the argument that the exhaustion-of-remedies requirement
did not apply to claims that would be untimely under the Act, finding that
such a construction of the statute "would nullify the limitations provision
and, with it, the Vaccine Act itself."'7 1 The court also rejected the plain-
tiffs' arguments that the absence in the Vaccine Act of a provision al-
lowing the filing of claims within a reasonable time after the discovery of
a causal relationship between the vaccine and the injury violated their
constitutional rights to equal protection, due process, and trial by jury.72
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A. THEORIES OF LIABILITY AND DEFENSES
1. Duty of a Supplier and the "Sophisticated Employer" Doctrine
The most anticipated development in the substantive law governing
toxic and mass torts was the release by the Texas Supreme Court of its
opinion in Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez. In Humble Sand, the
supreme court considered whether the "sophisticated user" doctrine ab-
solved a supplier of flint used in abrasive blasting (sandblasting) of liabil-
ity for injuries (silicosis) sustained by a worker as a result of his use of the
product. The worker claimed that the supplier was liable because the
packages of flint did not bear a label adequately warning workers of the
dangers of exposure to silica caused by the use of flint in abrasive blast-
ing; the supplier countered that it had no duty to convey such a warning
because employers engaged in abrasive blasting operations were fully
knowledgeable about the hazards and were in the best position to warn
of, and protect workers from, such hazards. The jury found that the sup-
plier's negligence proximately caused the worker's injuries and awarded
damages. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, and, in an
opinion described three Surveys ago, a divided Texarkana Court of Ap-
peals affirmed. 73
The supreme court reversed in a majority opinion by Justice Hecht,
holding that the record did not adequately establish whether or not the
70. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(B) (West 2003).
71. Blackmon v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 647, 654 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
72. Id. at 655-58.
73. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 48 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2001), rev'd, 146 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 2004), discussed in ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.,
Toxic Torts and Mass Torts, 55 SMU L. REV. 1375, 1375-76 (2002).
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flint suppliers had a duty to warn workers of the dangers posed by the use
of flint in abrasive blasting. The court emphasized that the existence of
such a duty depended not on the individual circumstances of a particular
case, but on the circumstances prevailing in the "abrasive blasting indus-
try as a whole."' 74 The court identified six factors to apply in determining
whether flint suppliers had a duty to warn: (1) the likelihood of serious
injury from a supplier's failure to warn; (2) the burden on a supplier of
giving a warning; (3) the feasibility and effectiveness of a supplier's warn-
ing; (4) the reliability of operators to warn their own employees; (5) the
existence and efficacy of other precautions; and (6) the social utility of
requiring, or not requiring, suppliers to warn. Application of these fac-
tors, the court noted, would allow the court to decide the ultimate issue of
whether the supplier "has a reasonable assurance that its warning will
reach those endangered by the use of its product. '75 Although the bur-
den of proof is usually on the plaintiff to show the existence and scope of
duty, a product supplier invoking the "sophisticated user" doctrine to
avoid liability bears the burden of negating the duty to warn because "in
most circumstances a supplier's duty is simply assumed." Cases in which
that "assumption is not warranted, as when sales are in bulk or there is an
intermediary who should have the duty to warn, seem more the exception
than the rule."'76 The court added that the supplier should bear the bur-
den of negating duty because suppliers generally have better access to
proof of industry practices which would render warnings from suppliers
ineffective and because most courts have treated the "intermediary issue"
as defensive.77 The court noted that the existence and scope of the duty
to warn is a question of law for the court, but if evidence relevant to the
duty issue is in conflict, "that conflict should first be resolved by the
finder of fact and then the duty issue determined. '78
Justice O'Neill issued a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Schneider
in which she observed that although the defendant probably appreciated
the opportunity for a retrial, the majority opinion did not provide the
defendant with "a clue what to do" to negate the supplier's duty to
warn.79 Contrary to precedent, Justice O'Neill argued, the majority
adopted a sophisticated user doctrine that "swallows the rule, absolving
manufacturers of the duty to warn even when the product is admittedly
dangerous and the manufacturer could easily provide an effective warn-
ing.",80 Justice O'Neill attributed the majority's "abandonment of funda-
mental product-liability principles" to its desire "to judicially cabin
widespread and oft-abused mass-tort claims that have arisen from latent
74. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 146 S.W.3d 170, 192 (Tex. 2004).





79. Id. at 197 (O'Neill, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 199.
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workplace injuries caused by substances like silica and asbestos." 81
2. Duty of a Product Designer
In Blackmon v. American Home Products Corp., a federal district court
held that a product designer who does not participate in or profit from
the product's manufacture does not owe a duty to plaintiffs who are in-
jured by the product. Although Eli Lilly ("Lilly") designed thimerosal, a
mercury-containing preservative that was used in vaccines received by the
minor plaintiffs, Lilly did not license other manufacturers to produce thi-
merosal or otherwise profit when companies copied Lilly's design. The
court determined that the burden of passing on information about the
hazards of thimerosal to unlicensed manufacturers was too great and,
even if Lilly had such a duty to pass on information of known or knowa-
ble hazards, plaintiffs could offer no evidence that Lilly knew or should
have known of the risk of autism from exposure to vaccines containing
thimerosal. 82
3. Duty of a Lessor
In Caldwell v. Curioni, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed summary
judgment, finding that the plaintiff presented evidence that the landlord
knew or should have known that toxic mold was present in the apartment
at the time it was leased but concealed that fact from the tenants. Al-
though landlords generally do not have a duty to protect tenants from
dangerous conditions on leased premises, a landlord may be liable if he
conceals defects of which he is aware or should be aware. The plaintiffs'
experts testified that the mold probably resulted from flooding caused by
a broken water heater. Before the plaintiffs rented the apartment, the
landlord repainted the carpet tackboards, apparently to conceal the mold
problem, and advertised the apartment as "freshly redone. ' 83 In light of
this evidence, the defendant "failed to conclusively negate he owed a
duty to the Caldwells." 84
4. Government Liability for Toxic Exposures
In City of San Antonio v. Pollock, the San Antonio Court of Appeals
affirmed judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that the plaintiffs' nuisance
claim for personal injuries from benzene exposure was brought "in the
nature of a takings claim" and thus fell within the exception to govern-
ment immunity provided in Article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitu-
tion.85 To fall within the exception, the nuisance must have resulted from
81. Id. at 203.
82. Blackmon v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 346 F. Supp. 2d 907 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
83. Caldwell v. Curioni, 125 S.W.3d 784, 791 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
84. Id.




the City's "non-negligent acts."'86 The release of benzene from the mu-
nicipal landfill was caused by the City's "intentional failure to act" be-
cause the City: (1) ignored internal recommendations that monitors be
placed in backyards along the perimeter of the landfill; (2) failed to up-
date the methane system for three years after reports showed the system
was inadequate "to insure compliance and safety;" (3) ignored TNRCC
recommendations that testing be performed ten feet below the surface;
and (4) misled the public, including the plaintiff, about the risk even
when the City knew toxins were migrating into the neighborhood from
the landfill.87 Because of the City's failure to act, the benzene migrated
onto the plaintiffs' property where prenatal exposure caused the minor
plaintiff to develop acute lymphocytic leukemia. Having found that the
nuisance claim fell within the immunity exception, the court concluded
that personal injury damages, provided for in nuisance actions under
Texas law, are also recoverable against the City.
In Watson v. Dallas Independent School District, the Waco Court of
Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendant school district,
holding that the defendant enjoyed sovereign immunity from the plain-
tiffs' claims for toxic exposures during their employment as maintenance
workers with the school district. Although the Hazard Communication
Act expressly applies to public schools, it does not provide a private cause
of action for violations of the statute and thus does not waive sovereign
immunity.88 Because the Labor Code does not apply to political subdivi-
sions of the State (such as the defendant school district), it too does not
waive sovereign immunity. 89 The plaintiffs' claims for occupational expo-
sure to toxins also do not come within the waiver of sovereign immunity
provided by the Texas Tort Claims Act because the claims do not involve
a motor vehicle. Nor do the claims fall within Article I, section 17 of the
Texas Constitution because they do not implicate the plaintiffs' right to
enjoy their property. 90
B. ADMISSIBILITY AND LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION
Texas trial and appellate courts continued to carefully scrutinize plain-
tiffs' scientific proof of causation in toxic tort cases. In Brookshire Broth-
ers, Inc. v. Smith, the First District Court of Appeals in Houston issued an
opinion on rehearing reversing judgment for the plaintiff, holding that
material safety data sheets ("MSDS") and warning labels cannot provide
a basis for an expert opinion on general causation because they do not
"provide the type of specific, detailed showing of scientific reliability re-
86. Id.
87. Id. at 328.
88. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 502.001-502.020 (Vernon 2003).
89. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 411.103 (Vernon 1996).
90. Watson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 S.W.3d 208 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, no
pet.).
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quired to accord evidentiary value to an expert's opinion." 91 The MSDS
and the warning labels provided on the cleaning products to which plain-
tiff was exposed stated that high levels of exposure could cause asthma
and reactive airways dysfunction syndrome ("RADS"), the same injury
suffered by the plaintiff. However, the MSDS and warning labels did not
cite studies to document the scientific basis for concluding that the prod-
ucts could cause these injuries. Because the plaintiff's expert cited no
scientific literature that supported a finding of general causation-i.e,
that the product was capable of causing RADS-the plaintiff had no evi-
dence of causation.
In In re R. O.C., the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's exclusion of the plaintiffs' experts' testimony and the resulting
summary judgment on causation because the plaintiffs failed to show that
they were exposed to injurious forms of asbestos or silica, and further
failed to offer reliable diagnoses of asbestosis or silicosis. Although the
plaintiffs provided proof that the paint and coating products used in the
facility contained asbestos and that the air was very dusty when these
products were sprayed, sanded or ground, they did not provide expert
testimony to establish that friable asbestos fibers were released in this
dust. Additionally, the type of silica contained in the products at issue
was not a type that had been proven to cause silicosis. The plaintiffs'
diagnoses themselves could not be considered proof of the plaintiffs' ex-
posure to asbestos, silica, or both, because the diagnoses "are circular,
from an assumption of exposure to a diagnosis based on that
assumption. '92
On the other hand, in City of San Antonio v. Pollock, the San Antonio
Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for the plaintiff, finding evidence
that benzene was present in and around the plaintiffs' home during the
mother's pregnancy in quantities sufficient to cause acute lymphocytic
leukemia ("ALL"), and that the minor plaintiff demonstrated chromo-
somal markings that signal exposure-related leukemia. The plaintiff and
defense experts provided models based on historical benzene and meth-
ane gas readings from nearby wells to estimate the levels of benzene pre-
sent in the home during the mother's pregnancy, both experts estimating
exposure levels that were high enough to cause ALL. Based on this evi-
dence, the plaintiff's expert testified that exposure to benzene from the
municipal landfill caused the minor plaintiff's ALL. The court refused to
entertain the defendant's argument that the evidence of causation was
insufficient under Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner93 because
91. Brookshire Bros. v. Smith, No. 01-02-00677, 2004 WL 1064776, at *5 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] May 13, 2004, no pet.). This is the court's second opinion on rehearing.
The first opinion on rehearing was reported in last year's Survey. See Rosenthal, supra
note 47, at 1277-78 (discussing Brookshire Bros. v. Smith, No. 01-02-00677, 2003 WL
23123043 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 31, 2003, no pet.)).
92. In re R.O.C., 131 S.W.3d 129, 137 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.).
93. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
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the defendant failed to preserve error by objecting on this basis at trial.94
In Caldwell v. Curioni, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed summary
judgment for the defendants in a toxic mold case, holding that reports
and affidavit testimony by plaintiff's experts provided evidence "regard-
ing the amount and types of mold found," including the presence of a
particular strain of mold which reportedly "produces a myotoxin docu-
mented as toxic to humans. ' ' 95 Although plaintiff's expert admitted the
dearth of standards for permissible airborne exposure to molds, the court
held that "the lack of any established standards does not confirm that the
levels of mold present were not dangerous. '96 The court found that the
plaintiff had presented more than a scintilla of evidence to defeat sum-
mary judgment.
The federal courts have also continued to demand solid proof of causa-
tion in toxic tort cases. In Blackmon v. American Home Products Corp.,
a federal district court held that the plaintiff's citation to a single study,
which found insufficient data to reach a conclusion on the ability of thi-
merosal-containing vaccines to cause neurological damage in children,
was no evidence that the minor plaintiff's autism was caused by exposure
to thimerosal. The court noted that the plaintiffs had made no effort to
exclude other causes of autism or to show that the thimerosal worked in
combination with those other known causes to cause the minor plaintiff's
autism. Finally, the court held that any link between the defendant de-
signer's actions in the 1920s and 1930s and the minor plaintiff's autism
several decades later was not foreseeable and was too attenuated to sup-
port a causation finding.97
94. City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 155 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. App.-San AntonioAug. 18, 2004, no pet.). The court also rejected the defendant's argument concerning thejury's failure to make a finding on causation. Because the defendant failed to object to the
omission of this element from the charge, the court deemed the finding necessary to sup-
port the judgment.
95. Caldwell v. Curioni, 125 S.W.3d 784, 793 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
96. Id.
97. Blackmon v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 346 S.W.3d 907 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
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